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1803 Marbury v The
case began on 1819 McCulloch v In
1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the 1824 Gibbons v Ogden “Federal Control of Interstate Commerce” Robert Livingston secured from the New York State
Legislature an exclusive twenty-year grant to navigate the rivers and other
waters of the State. The grant further provided that no one should be allowed to
navigate New York waters by steam without a license from Livingston and his
partner, Robert Fulton, and any unlicensed vessel should be forfeited to them.
Ogden had secured a license for steam navigation from Fulton and Livingston.
Gibbons originally had been partners with Odgen but was now his rival. Gibbons
was operating steamboats between New York and New Jersey under the authority of
a license obtained from the United States. Ogden petitioned the New York court
and obtained an injunction ordering Gibbons to stop operating his boats in New
York waters. Issue : Whether
the New York statute that prohibited vessels licensed by the United States from
navigating the waters of New York was unconstitutional and, therefore, void.
Opinion: Writing for the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Marshall
said that the injunction against Gibbons was invalid because the monopoly
granted by the New York statute conflicted with a valid federal law. The Court
used this case to put forth the position that Congress can legislate and
regulate all matters of interstate commerce as long as there is some commercial
connection with another state. While interstate commerce is regulated by
Congress, the power to regulate “completely internal” commerce (trade
carried on in a state that does not affect other states) is reserved to the
states. 1856
Dred Scot v Sanford “Slaves
are Property” Dred
Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free
state) and in an area of the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by
the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott sued
unsuccessfully in the Missouri courts for his freedom, claiming that his
residence in free territory made him a free man. Scott then brought a new suit
in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no pure-blooded Negro of
African descent and the descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of
Article III of the Constitution. Was Dred Scott free or slave?
Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III and IV, argued Taney, no one but a
citizen of the United States could be a citizen of a state, and that only
Congress could confer national citizenship. Taney reached the conclusion that no
person descended from an American slave had ever been a citizen for Article III
purposes. The Court then held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, hoping
to end the slavery question once and for all. 1895
Re Debs
“Injunctions vs. Strikes Upheld”
Eugene
V. Debs, an American railway union officer and one of the leaders of the Pullman
Railroad Car workers’ strike in 1894, refused to honor a federal court
“injunction” ordering him to halt the strike. Debs appealed his “contempt
of court” conviction. Issue: Whether the federal government has the
constitutional authority to stop railroad workers from striking.
Opinion: The Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous decision,
upheld the authority of the federal government to halt the strike. The Court
reasoned that the federal government has “enumerated powers” found in
Article 1, Section 8, to “regulate commerce ... among the several states,”
and to establish post offices and post roads. When the American Railway Union
struck, it interfered with the railroad’s ability to carry commerce and mail
which benefited the needs and “general welfare” of all Americans. 1896 Plessy v Ferguson “Separate but equal is legal” In
1892, Plessy purchased a first class ticket on the East Louisiana Railway, from
New Orleans to Covington, Louisiana. Plessy, who was of racially mixed descent
(one-eighth black and seven-eighths Caucasian), was a United States citizen and
a resident of the state of Louisiana. When he entered the train, he took a seat
in the coach where only whites were permitted to sit. He was told by the
conductor to leave the coach and to find another seat on the train where
non-whites were permitted to sit. Plessy did not move and was ejected by force
from the train. Plessy was sent to jail for violating the Louisiana Act of 1890,
which required railway companies to provide “separate but equal”
accommodations for white and black races. Plessy argued that this law was
unconstitutional. Issue : Whether laws which provided for the separation of
races violated the rights of blacks as guaranteed by the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Opinion:
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Louisiana Act, which stated
that “all railway companies were to provide equal but separate accommodations
for white and black races” did not violate the Constitution. This law did not
take away from the federal authority to regulate interstate commerce, nor did it
violate the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery. Additionally, the law
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, which gave all blacks citizenship, and
forbade states from passing any laws which would deprive blacks of their
constitutional rights. The Court believed that “separate but equal” was the
most reasonable approach considering the social prejudices which prevailed at
the time. 1914
Fremont
Weeks Plff. v.United States: “The Exclusionary Rule” The
defendant, Freemont Weeks, was arrested by a police officer at the Union Station
in Kansas City, Missouri. Other police
officers had gone to the house of Mr. Weeks and, after being told where a key
could be found, entered the residence without a warrant, in violation
of the 4th and 5th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. They searched Weeks
room and took possession of various papers and articles, including certain
coupons or tickets representing chances or shares in a lottery or gift
enterprise (lottery tickets), in violation of section 213 of the Criminal Code
of the United States. A trial was
held and Weeks was convicted and the penalty of a fine and imprisonment was
imposed. Issue: Can evidence, gained by an illegal search
by federal officers, be admissible in a federal court? Decision:
The Supreme
Court reached the conclusion that the letters in question had been taken by an
official of the United States, acting under the color of his office, in direct
violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant.
The use of the evidence, in this court’s opinion, is inadmissible in a
federal court.
Reasoning:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.” The
court declared illegally gained evidence “fruit of the poison tree” and
ordered that illegally gained evidence be excluded in the future from any
federal court. Justice Day reasoned, “If letters and private documents can
thus be seized and held and used as evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and … might as well be
stricken from the Constitution.” Opinion:
Nowhere in the
U.S. Constitution is there clear cut mention of what to do with evidence
obtained illegally. The Supreme
Court coined this “fruit of the poison tree” analogy as a precedent.
Although an exclusionary rule protects the
“sacrifice of
those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land”, one wonders
if a suitable system in which evidence of guilt (or innocence for that matter) should
not be thrown out like
garbage, but instead remain as evidence rather than let the guilty go free.
Those who violate established Constitutional principles should suffer,
not the victims of crime or society as a whole.
Many countries in the world do not have the exclusionary rule and
continue to uphold judicial integrity as well as preserving basic fundamental
freedoms. The judicial system should
work hard to create a fair and just system that protects peoples’ life,
liberty, and property from others, one in which criminals fear for their rights
being taken away, as they should. 1919 Schenck v United States “Clear and
present danger” Charles
T. Schenck and Elizabeth Baer, charged with conspiring to print and circulate
documents intended to cause insubordination within the military, were convicted
of violating the Espionage Act of 1917. The act made it a crime to “willfully
cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of
duty in the military ... or to willfully obstruct the recruiting service of the
United States.” Schenck appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court of the
United States, claiming all his actions were protected by the First Amendment.
Issue: Whether Schenck’s and Baer’s First Amendment right to freedom
of speech were violated when they were convicted of conspiring to obstruct the
recruitment and enlistment of service. Opinion : The Court unanimously upheld
the conviction of Schenck, not for violation of the Espionage Act, but rather
for conspiracy to violate it. The Court found that the First Amendment did not
apply in this case, and that Schenck’s speech was not constitutionally
protected because it posed a “clear and present danger” to the country. The
nation was involved in World War I, and the Court saw Schenck’s speech and
action as counter-productive to the national war effort. The Court reasoned that
certain speech could be curtailed, using the example of a situation where one
cannot yell “fire” in a crowded theatre. Benjamin
Gitlow had been a prominent member of the Socialist party during the 1920s. He
was arrested and convicted for violating the New York Criminal Anarchy Law of
1902, which made it a crime to attempt to foster the violent overthrow of
government. Gitlow's publication and circulation of sixteen thousand copies of
the Left-Wing Manifesto violated this Criminal Anarchy Act. The pamphlet went on
to advocate the creation of a socialist system through the use of massive
strikes and "class action...in any form." Gitlow was tried and
convicted. He appealed the decision, arguing that his First Amendment right to
freedoms of speech and press was violated. Although the New York courts held
that the Communists must be held accountable for the results of their
propaganda, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gitlow. It stated in its
decision that "for present purposes, we may assume that freedom of speech
and of press...are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
State." Between
1941 and 1945, there were strong anti-Japanese feelings in the United States due
to the war with Japan. In May 1942, Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese
descent, was convicted in federal court of “knowingly remaining in a
designated military area in San Leandro, California.” His actions violated
Exclusion Order #34 and Executive Order #9066 of 1942, which had been issued to
protect the West Coast from acts of espionage and sabotage. The Acts required
all Japanese-Americans living in restricted areas to go to inland relocation
centers. Korematsu believed the order violated his constitutional rights. Issue:
Whether Executive Order #9066 of 1942, violated Korematsu’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection of the law and his Fifth Amendment right to
life, liberty, and property; and whether, because of the special circumstance of
the world war, Congress or the President had the power to violate Korematsu’s
constitutional rights. Opinion: In a rare decision, 6-3, the Supreme Court of
the United States ruled that an entire race could be labeled a “suspect
classification,” meaning that the government was permitted to deny the
Japanese their constitutional rights because of military considerations. Because
a number of Japanese may have been disloyal, the military felt that complete
exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas was essential
during wartime. The Court ruled that such exclusion was not beyond the war
powers of Congress and the President since their interest in national security
was “compelling.” 1954 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas “Separate but equal is not equal or legal” Black
children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children
under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to the races. The white
and black schools approached equality in terms of buildings, curricula,
qualifications, and teacher salaries. This case was decided together with Briggs
v. Elliott and Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County.
Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of
race deprive the minority children of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment? Yes.
Despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors,
intangible issues foster and maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public
education has a detrimental effect on minority children because it is
interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine that separate
facilities were permissible provided they were equal was rejected. Separate but
equal is inherently unequal in the context of public education. The unanimous
opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial
separation. In May 1957, Cleveland police officers received a tip
that Miss Mapp was in possession of a large number of betting slips, and that a
bomber was hiding in her home. When the police arrived at her house, Mapp
refused to admit them without a search warrant. A few hours later, the police
knocked again, then forcibly opened the door. A struggle ensued and Mapp was put
in handcuffs, taken upstairs, and kept there while police searched her
apartment. During the search, obscene materials were discovered in a trunk in
her basement. Mapp was arrested for possession and control of obscene materials.
Issue : Whether Miss Mapp’s Fourth Amendment right to be secure from
search and seizure was violated during the search of her home. Charles
W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to
apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored.
Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored
significant economic growth and population shifts within the state. Did the
Supreme Court have jurisdiction over questions of legislative apportionment?
In an opinion which explored the nature of "political
questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held
that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that
legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. In his opinion, Justice
Brennan provided past examples in which the Court had intervened to correct
constitutional violations in matters pertaining to state administration and the
officers through whom state affairs are conducted. Brennan concluded that the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and others raised in
this case merited judicial evaluation. 1962 Englel v Vitale: “Establishment
Clause”
The
Board of Regents for the State of New York authorized a short, voluntary prayer
for recitation at the start of each school day. This was an attempt to defuse
the politically potent issue by taking it out of the hands of local communities.
The blandest of invocations read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge
our dependence upon Thee, and beg Thy blessings upon us, our teachers, and our
country." Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the state of
the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the
First Amendment? Yes. Neither
the prayer's nondenominational character nor its voluntary character saves it
from unconstitutionality. By providing the prayer, New York officially approved
religion. This was the first in a series of cases in which the Court used the
establishment clause to eliminate religious activities of all sorts, which had
traditionally been a part of public ceremonies. Despite the passage of time, the
decision is still unpopular with a majority of Americans. Clarence
Earl Gideon was arrested in 1961, and charged with breaking and entering a pool
hall with intent to commit petty larceny (a felony). He did not have enough
money for a lawyer and asked that one be appointed to defend him. The judge
denied the request, saying that under Florida state law, counsel can be
appointed only in a capital offense. Gideon was sentenced to five years in
prison. He then filed a writ of certiorari (petition of appeal) to the Supreme
Court of the United States, asking for a case review. The Court granted
Gideon’s request and appointed Abe Fortas to represent him. Issue : Whether
the state of Florida violated Gideon’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, by not providing him with
the assistance of counsel for his criminal defense
Opinion :The Court ruled unanimously in Gideon’s favor, and held that
the Fourteenth Amendment included state as well as federal defendants. The Court
said that all states must provide an attorney in all felony and capital cases
for people who cannot afford one themselves. Through the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel
applies to the states. [Gideon was retried in Florida and found not guilty.] Nature
of Case: Challenge to a Connecticut law prohibiting use of contraceptives.
Holding: The law is unconstitutional. The Constitution contains a "right to
privacy" that protects the decision of married couples to use
contraceptives. New Haven, Connecticut, 1961. Estelle Griswold and Dr. Jack
Buxton, are convicted of violating the state's birth control law. Both work for
Planned Parenthood. Their crime: giving medical advice and prescribing
contraceptives to married couples that ask for them.
They appeal. In 1965, Justice William Douglas writes the Supreme Court's
decision: ``While it may shock some of my Brethren that the Court today holds
that the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy, in my view it is
far more shocking to believe that the personal liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution does not include protection against such totalitarian limitation of
family size, which is at complete variance with our constitutional concepts.
Yet, if upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing
voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then, by the same
reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid.
In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights
of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected.
The federal constitution has no explicit right to privacy. But Justice
Douglas refers to "zones of privacy" built on other guarantees: due
process of law; freedom of association; no unreasonable search and seizure. 1964 Escobedo v Illinois “Right to
remain silent restricts confessions” Escobedo
was arrested in 1960, in connection with the murder of his brother-in-law. After
his arrest, he requested to see his lawyer but was not allowed to do so. After
persistent questioning by the police, Escobedo made a statement which was used
against him at his trial and he was convicted of murder. He appealed to the
Illinois Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction. Escobedo then appealed to
the Supreme Court of the United States. Issue :Whether the state of Illinois
violated Escobedo’s Fourteenth Amendment protections, his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent, and his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel
by denying his request to speak to a lawyer before questioning. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed by the United States Congress, prohibited
racial discrimination and segregation in public accommodations. The owner of the
Heart of Atlanta Motel refused accommodations to blacks and filed suit, claiming
that such control over an individual’s business was not within the powers of
Congress. Issue: Whether the United
States Congress, under its authority to regulate interstate commerce, has the
power to require private businesses within a state to comply with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prevents discrimination in places of public
accommodations. Opinion: The Supreme
Court of the United States held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
constitutional. The Court said that the commerce clause of the Constitution
empowers Congress to regulate both commercial and non-commercial interstate
travel. Since the motel served interstate travelers, its refusal to accommodate
blacks posed a potential obstruction to their freedom of movement across state
lines. Congress has a right to regulate individual businesses in the interest of
promoting interstate travel. The Court was called upon to consider the
constitutionality of a number of instances, ruled on jointly, in which
defendants were questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of
[their] freedom in any significant way." In Vignera v. New York, the
petitioner was questioned by police, made oral admissions, and signed an
inculpatory statement all without being notified of his right to counsel.
Similarly, in Westover v. United States, the petitioner was arrested by the FBI,
interrogated, and made to sign statements without being notified of his right to
counsel. Lastly, in California v. Stewart, local police held and interrogated
the defendant for five days without notification of his right to counsel. In all
these cases, suspects were questioned by police officers, detectives, or
prosecuting attorneys in rooms that cut them off from the outside world. In none
of the cases were suspects given warnings of their rights at the outset of their
interrogation. Does the police
practice of interrogating individuals without notifiying them of their right to
counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth
Amendment? The Court held that
prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of
defendants unless they demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards
"effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." The
Court noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is
psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that "the blood
of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional
inquisition." The Court specifically outlined the necessary aspects of
police warnings to suspects, including warnings of the the right to remain
silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogations. In December 1965, Marybeth and John Tinker planned to
wear black arm bands to school signifying their protest of the Vietnam War.
School officials became aware of the plan beforehand and adopted regulation
banning the wearing of such armbands. Failure to comply with this regulation
would result in suspension until the student returned to school without the
armbands. Both Tinkers went ahead and wore the black armbands to school. They
were suspended and told not to return with the armbands. The Tinkers claimed
that their rights of free speech and expression, which are protected under the
First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, had been violated, and
that they should have been allowed to attend school wearing the armbands. Issue:
Whether Marybeth and John Tinker have a First Amendment right to free speech to
wear black armbands as a symbol of protest in a public school
Opinion: The Court decided that the students did have a right to wear the
armbands. It reasoned that the wearing of the armbands was an exercise of the
students’ right to free, silent, symbolic speech, which is protected under the
First Amendment: “Students do not shed their constitutional rights at the
schoolhouse gate, and therefore are entitled to the free expression of their
views as long as there is no substantial or material interference of the
educational process.” The defendant, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group,
spoke at a Klan rally at which a large wooden cross was burned and some of the
other persons present were carrying firearms. His remarks included such
statements as: "Bury the niggers," "the niggers should be
returned to Africa," and "send the Jews back to Israel." In an
Ohio state court, he was convicted, under Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute,
both for advocating the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
industrial or political reform, and for voluntarily assembling with any society,
group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of
criminal syndicalism. Although he challenged the constitutionality of the
criminal syndicalism statute under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution, the intermediate appellate court of Ohio affirmed his
conviction without opinion, and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed his appeal
on the ground that no substantial constitutional question was presented.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. In a per curiam
opinion, expressing the unanimous views of the court and overruling Whitney v
California (1927) 274 US 357, 71 L Ed 1095, 47 S Ct 641, it was held that the
constitutional guaranties of free speech and free press did not permit a state
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation, except
where such advocacy was directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and was likely to incite or produce such action, and that since the Ohio
criminal syndicalism statute, by its own words and as applied, purported to
punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly
with others merely to advocate the described type of action, the statute
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Black and Douglas, JJ., each concurring separately, joined the court's
opinion, but expressed disagreement with the "clear and present
danger" test which had been applied in an earlier decision cited by the
court. The
United States wanted to restrain the New York Times and the Washington Post
newspapers from publishing a classified study on Vietnam policy entitled,
“History of United States Decision Making Process on Vietnam Policy,”
commonly called “Pentagon Papers.” Issue : Whether the President of the
United States had the power to stop the publication of historical news that
might have an impact on the Vietnam War. Opinion : The Supreme Court of the
United States said that prior restraints (prohibiting information from being
published or aired) are almost never valid. The Government must strongly justify
any abridgment of a newspaper’s freedom of speech. Since, in the eyes of the
Court, national security was not threatened by the printing of the “Pentagon
Papers,” no prior restraint was necessary and the Government’s attempt at
censorship was unconstitutional. This case involved the issue of whether a
person could be exempted from military service because of his objecting to a
particular war rather than war in general. Gillette refused to report for
induction but claimed that he would participate in wars of national defense or
United Nations peace-keeping wars. His reasons for believing the Vietnam War was
unjust were based on his "humanist approach to religion" and his
deeply held views concerning the nature of human existence. The petitioners
state that their freedom to exercise their religions have been crippled because
some religions object only to particular wars.
The Court decided 8-1 that Congress did not act unconstitutionally by
limiting conscientious objector status to those people who objected to all wars.
This decision limited itself to assessing the constitutionality of the
Congressional limitations on conscientious objection. Marshall stated "Of
course we do not suggest that Congress would have acted irrationally or
unreasonably had it decided to exempt those who object to particular wars."
People are now required to become religious pacifists if they wish to be exempt
from military service. William Henry Furman, a 26 year old African American, attempted to
burglarize a home in Georgia. When the homeowner awoke and attempted to stop
him, Mr. Furman tried to escape. He tripped and dropped his gun, which went off,
killing the homeowner. At the trial, Mr. Furman was found guilty of murder,
despite a claim of mental incompetence. Under Georgia statute, the jury had the
option of recommending the death penalty or life imprisonment. Mr. Furman was
sentenced to death. His lawyer argued the Georgian death penalty law was
excessively cruel and: (1) made rehabilitation impossible; (2) imprisonment was
an available alternative; and (3) the death penalty was imposed almost
exclusively on poor people and black persons.
Issue: Whether Mr. Furman’s death sentence was a violation of the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Opinion: In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court of the United States struck
down all existing state death penalty laws. The justices reasoned these death
penalty laws left almost unlimited discretion to the judges or juries in
deciding the sentence. The majority of the justices agreed that almost all those
convicted in capital trials were black or poor or both, which they found
“capriciously selective.” The Court did not declare capital punishment a
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” clause.
Instead, it declared the existing death penalty laws violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These three cases from Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
involved public assistance to private schools, some of which were religious.
Pennsylvania's law included paying the salaries of teachers in parochial
schools, assisting the purchasing of textbooks, and other teaching supplies. In
Rhode Island, the State paid 15% of the salaries of private school teachers. A
federal court upheld the Pennsylvania law while a District Court ruled that the
Rhode Island law fostered 'excessive entanglement'. The Court unanimously (8-0)
determined that the assistance was unconstitutional. There are three criteria
that should be used to assess legislation: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances or inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster
and excessive government Entanglement with religion." The two statutes in
question violate the third of these criteria. The teachers whose salaries are
being partially paid by the State are religious agents who work under the
control of religious officials. There is an inherent conflict in this situation
of which the state should remain clear. To ensure that teachers play a
non-ideological role would require the state to become entangled with the
church. Allowing this relationship could lead to political problems in areas in
which a large number of students attend religious schools.
Instituted the Lemon test for analyzing statutes relating to church-state
interaction. Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her
pregancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant
woman's life. After granting certiorari, the Court heard arguments twice. The
first time, Roe's attorney -- Sarah Weddington -- could not locate the
constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. Her opponent --
Jay Floyd -- misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her constitutional
argument in the second round. Her new opponent -- Robert Flowers -- came under
strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall.
Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
by abortion? The Court held
that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized
in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision
gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and
defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters.
As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling. [The
Court's majority opinion received sharp criticism from all quarters on the
ground that it was not a constitutional decision. In a 1993 interview, the
author -- Justice Harry Blackmun -- sought to convince the public, if not his
critics, that he was on firm constitutional ground.] Appellant was convicted of mailing unsolicited
sexually explicit material in violation of a California statute that
approximately incorporated the obscenity test formulated in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (plurality opinion). The trial court instructed
the jury to evaluate the materials by the contemporary community standards of
California. Appellant's conviction was affirmed on appeal. In lieu of the
obscenity criteria enunciated by the Memoirs plurality, it is held: 1.
Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, reaffirmed. A work may be subject to state regulation where that
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex; portrays, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and, taken as a whole, does not have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. 2.
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Roth, supra, at
489, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. If a state obscenity law is thus limited, First Amendment
values are adequately protected by ultimate independent appellate review of
constitutional claims when necessary. A grand jury returned indictments against
seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The
special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audiotapes of
conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was
immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege," which is the
right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve
confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the
national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States.
Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his
"executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely immune from
judicial review? No. The Court held
that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an
absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was
a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but
gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the
fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the
subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the
release of the tapes. On January 2, 1975, the suit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia by Senator James L. Buckley of New
York, Eugene McCarthy, Presidential candidate and former Senator from Minnesota,
and several others. 1 The defendants included Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of the
Senate and Ex Officio member of the newly formed Federal Election Commission,
and the Commission itself. 2 The plaintiffs charged that the FECA, under which
the Commission was formed, and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act were
unconstitutional on a number of grounds. The
appellants had argued that the FECA's limitations on the use of money for
political purposes were in violation of First Amendment protections for free
expression, since no significant political expression could be made without the
expenditure of money. The Court concurred in part with the appellants' claim,
finding that the restrictions on political contributions and expenditures
"necessarily reduce[d] the quantity of expression by restricting the number
of issues discussed, the depth of the exploration, and the size of the audience
reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's
mass society requires the expenditure of money." The Court then determined
that such restrictions on political speech could only be justified by an
overriding governmental interest. In this case the court upheld the constitutionality
of the death penalty, defending statutes that guide judges and juries in the
decision to issue the death sentence. The defendant in this case, Gregg, had
been convicted on two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder. The
trial judge, who was following Georgia state law, instructed the jury to return
with either a decision of life imprisonment or the death penalty. Justice Byron
stated in his opinion that Gregg had failed in his burden of showing that the
Georgia Supreme Court had not done all it could to prevent discriminatory
practices in the forming of his sentence. This decision became the first time
the Court stated that "punishment of death does not invariably violate the
Constitution." Allan
Bakke, a white male, applied to the University of California at Davis Medical
School. He was denied admission because he did not meet the standard entrance
requirements. Davis Medical School also had a special admissions program for
minorities. Sixteen per cent of the available places were reserved for
minorities who did not meet the standard entrance requirements. Bakke argued
that the requirements for special admissions to the medical school were
discriminatory because only African-American, Chicano, and Asian students could
compete for these places. The University of California argued that its special
admissions program remedied the long standing historical wrong of racial
discrimination. Issue: Whether
the University’s special admissions program, which accepted minority students
with significantly lower scores than Bakke, violated Bakke’s Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights; and whether the University was permitted to
take race into account as a factor in its future admissions decisions.
Opinion: The Supreme Court of the United States did not render a majority
opinion in this case (i.e., one in which five or more of the nine justices
agree). Six separate opinions were written, and no more than four justices
agreed in whole in their reasoning. The Court ordered Bakke’s admission to
Davis Medical School and invalidated the University’s special admissions
program because the program barred people like Bakke from applying for the
special admissions seats in the medical school. However, of much greater
significance was the fact that the Court allowed institutions of higher learning
to take race into account as a factor in their future admissions decisions.
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackman said that this aspect was the
central meaning of the case: “Government may take race into account when it
acts not to insult any racial group but to remedy disadvantages cast on
minorities by past racial prejudice.” [While
to some observers Bakke won a place in the school and the particular special
admissions program at Davis was invalidated, the case really stands as a
landmark civil rights-affirmative action decision. Race may hereafter be taken
into account as a factor in college admissions.] The parents of three children attending public school
in Alabama challenged the constitutionality of an Alabama law which authorized a
one minute period of silence in all public schools for meditation or voluntary
prayer. Kathy Kuhlmeier and two other journalism
students wrote articles on pregnancy and divorce for their school newspaper.
Their teacher submitted page proofs to the principal for approval. The principal
objected to the articles because he felt that the students described in the
article on pregnancy, although not named, could be identified, and the father
discussed in the article on divorce was not allowed to respond to the derogatory
article. The principal also said that the language used was not appropriate for
younger students. When the newspaper was printed, two pages containing the
articles in question as well as four other articles approved by the principal
were deleted. Issue: Whether the
Hazelwood School District violated the freedom of expression right of the First
Amendment by regulating the content of its school newspaper.
Opinion: The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Hazelwood
School District did not violate the First Amendment right of the students. The
Court ruled that although schools may not limit the personal expression of
students that happens to occur on school grounds, Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S.
503 (1969), they do not have to promote student speech that they do not agree
with. This decision gave schools the power to censor activities such as school
plays and school newspapers as long as the school finances the activities and
there are grounds for the censorship. The Court said in Tinker that in order to
censor a student’s expression, the expression must substantially disrupt the
school’s educational process, or impinge upon the rights of others. This case
broadened that guideline to include censorship of unprofessional, ungrammatical
or obscene speech, or speech that goes against the fundamental purpose of a
school. In
1984, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag in front of the Dallas City
Hall. He burned the flag as a means of protest against the policies of President
Ronald Reagan’s Administration. Under Texas law desecration of the American
flag is a criminal offense. Mr. Johnson was convicted and sentenced to one year
in jail and a $2,000 fine. Issue:
Does a law against desecration of the American flag violate an individual’s
right to freedom of speech as found in the First Amendment?
Opinion: In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court of the United States found
that desecrating the flag as an act of protest is an act of expression, an act
protected by the First Amendment. The Court found that burning the American flag
was political speech which Justice Brennan wrote “...is the bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment. Government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” In
1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act which made it a crime to destroy
an American flag or any likeness of an American flag which may be "commonly
displayed." The law did, however, allow proper disposal of a worn or soiled
flag. Several prosecutions resulted from the Act. Eichman set a flag ablaze on
the steps of the U.S. Capitol while protesting the government's domestic and
foreign policy. Another prosecution (United States v. Haggerty) resulted from a
flag-burning in Seattle protesting the passage of the Flag Protection Act.Both
cases (Eichman's and Haggerty's) were argued together.
Did the Act violate freedom of expression protected by the First
Amendment? In a 5-to-4 decision,
coming on the heels of a similar holding in Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Court
struck down the law because "its asserted interest is related to the
suppression of free expression and concerned with the content of such
expression." Allowing the flag to be burned in a disposal ceremony but
prohibiting protestors from setting it ablaze at a political protest made that
clear, argued Justice Brennan in one of his final opinions. The U.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina
congressional reapportionment plan because the plan created only one
black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two
black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than
the interstate road along which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents
challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, alleging
that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black
representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to
state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Did the North Carolina residents' claim, that the State
created a racially gerrymandered district, raise a valid constitutional issue
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Yes. The Court held
that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its
face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it
constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race.
The unusual district, while perhaps created by noble intentions, seemed to
exceed what was reasonably necessary to avoid racial imbalances. After
concluding that the residents' claim did give rise to an equal protection
challenge, the Court remanded - adding that in the absence of contradictory
evidence, the District Court would have to decide whether or not some compelling
governmental interest justified North Carolina's plan. The 1996 Federal Communications Decency Act sought to
protect minors from “indecent” and offensive Internet materials. The Act
made it a crime to transmit obscene or indecent messages over the Internet.
Issue : Whether the 1996 Communications Decency Act violates the First
and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution by being vague in its definition of the
types of Internet communications it could find unlawful.
Opinion: The Supreme Court of the United States, in a 7-2 decision, held
the Communications Decency Act violated the First Amendment. The Court reasoned
the act did not clearly define “indecent.” The Court felt the act could
establish a content-based blanket restriction of free speech and the act did not
demonstrate an authority on the unique nature of the internet and its social
value. James
Dale, a former Eagle Scout, had become an assistant scoutmaster at the age of
18. He accepted his homosexuality about a year later. When he was quoted in a
newspaper story subsequently about the difficulty he had in accepting his
homosexuality, the Monmouth (N.J.) Council of the Boy Scouts took away his
registration. Dale sued under
a New Jersey civil rights law. In the years of court battles that followed, he
lost the first decision in 1995, but in 1999 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled
unanimously in his favor. The Boy Scouts appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
That court’s 5-4 ruling agreed with the Scouts’ legal position that forcing
the organization to accept homosexual troop leaders would violate the group’s
constitutional rights to free expression and free association.
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